Consular Operations

ConOps' cover is Harrington Financial, a legitimate private investment and trading firm.

The two big resources they have are money and intelligence. Money they receive via private investing, of which they are very good, mostly because of the their second resource. Intelligence they siphon from intelligence sources without the cumbersome organizational bureaucracy or political red tape. Utilizing the intelligence briefings from the these various sources Harrington Financial is able to see currency or market fluctuations ahead of most financial institutions and is able to utilize this information on the financial market. The profits generated from trading on financial institutions are utilized by Harrington Financial to fund Consular Operations.

The organization includes leadership (Ethan Harrington - Founder/CEO, Michael Kesler - Chief Strategic Planning, Jennifer Harrington - Director of Operations, Benjamin Browning - Director of Logistics & Transportation, ). In addition to leadership, there are 4 portfolio managers/accountants, 4 security personnel, 2 pilots, 1 operations support/medic, and 3 IT personnel. The PCs are the Operation Team.

ConOps pulls data feeds securely from DHS, CIA, DIA, and the FBI. Additionally, there is some shared intelligence between allied nations aware of ConOps (Canada, Japan, UK, Australia, and Israel). The data that flows through ConOps is a virtual clearinghouse of intelligence, almost too much to process, but the data streams are there. ConOps tends to act on the fringe intelligence hits. The missions the team is assigned tends to put them ahead of most, if not all intelligence organizations. Additionally, there is less risk of moles and mission compromise from hostile sources (ConOps doesn't exist, on the books or otherwise). As such ConOps operates outside of any federal jurisdiction as it is not a formal member of the United States intelligence community.

ConOps provides the team with access to intelligence, transportation, and money. Most gear is commercial-off-the-shelf tech (COTs). It can afford the best equipment, and does not have to answer to any fiscal oversight committee. Specialized support can, at times, be leveraged from nearby US and military assets, but this the exception rather than the rule, as it risks ConOps exposure. ConOps would rather act as a go-between, if necessary, rather than expose the PCs.

The PCs are basically chosen from the civilian, military, and US intelligence community. Members are administratively suspended (in good standing), but may still at time, request favors (via Patron (parent org), Contact group, or Rank).

Example: PCs know the NRO sat is nearing their target area, and requisition imagery. PCs make appropriate rolls, ConOps, via its own operatives, tasks the satellite on the PCs behalf, failure does not directly expose the PCs to scrutiny. Alternatively (more risk of exposure) PCs have a friend, contact, or rank in the NRO and call in the tasking themselves, rolls may be easier to make, but there is the risk of unwanted questions.

PCs are also able to exercise their legal enforcement power (while in their home country), but they are expected to turn in detainees with a proper chain of custody with regards to evidence (if they hope to effect prosecution). Now, if they are just detaining a target for questioning, and they are not a US citizen... (it sucks to be a bad guy). They are not sanctioned for murder, but the view of self-defense, and protection of others is very broad. Killing a dude because he is a drug dealer is seriously frowned on, but preemptively killing the same drug dealer because he is planning to execute an attack on US citizens or its allies is another story.