Guardacostas

Cuban guardacosta, 1695; The use of oared vessels such as this galeota were common among guardacostas, allowing them to pursue their prey even in calm winds.

*Armada de Barlovento—Spain’s permanent naval squadron in the Caribbean. HQ alternating between Havana and Veracruz. In the early 1730s the force consisted of only four ships. While sufficient for the Armada’s main employment of transporting situados—silver used for the payment of garrisons and governmental expenses in Spain’s West Indian colonies—and escorting the treasure fleets across the Atlantic during peacetime, those obligations consumed the entirety of its meager resources.

• Between 1724 and 1732 officials dispatched two warships from Spain to patrol the coast of Colombia and Venezuela for smugglers.
• From the perspective of Spain’s imperial economy, therefore, Mendinueta’s primary responsibility lay with protecting the galleons rather than limiting foreign imports…If confiscation of one foreign vessel would frighten the others away from the port, Mendinueta would sacrifice his ability to provide for Cartagena’s coast guard defense by vigorously prosecuting the contraband trade.
• Any foreign vessel found not travelling directly to or from its colonies was considered suspicious, particularly if within sight of Spanish lands. Such a voyage was considered to be undertaken in rumbos sospechosos. The vessel could therefore be stopped and searched by any Spaniard official. The policy took no account of travel between foreign colonies, and almost as little to the vagaries of wind and weather.
• Cuban-based guardacostas concentrated on the Windward Passage between eastern Cuba and Saint Domingue and the Florida Channel; the main routes by which vessels departing Jamaica travelled. They also patrolled the Bahamas, which Spain still laid claim to, frequently seizing salt gatherers at Turks Island.46 Puerto Rican privateers terrorized the Leeward Islands, and frequently cruised along the southern coast of Hispaniola, seizing vessels coming from Europe to Jamaica.
• Although foreign powers, particularly the British, maintained that a vessel could be stopped and searched for illicit trade only if it was found immediately off a Spanish shore and actively trading, Spanish officials maintained a much more expansive view of when and where a vessel could be seized.
• When it stopped a foreign vessel, generally with a warning shot, the guardacosta would dispatch a small boat to board and examine the foreigner for contraband goods. The captain’s cabin, the hold, and the personal lockers of crew and passengers were all searched for items that could have come from Spanish territories. Silver coins, cochineal, cacao, and, most commonly, logwood or “brazil wood” were all considered evidence of potential illegal trade, even if the vessel’s papers revealed it had last sailed from a non-Spanish colony. Such claims meant little, for, culturally and legally, Spanish officials believed that items possessed something akin to a vitium reale—an inherent taint characteristic in the item itself. In their view, a product was forever marked by its country of origin; once a Spanish product always a Spanish product.

The crew aboard a guardacosta worked not for wages, but for shares of prizes. This created incentives to seize any vessel they encountered. Although bloodless captures were the norm, under such pressure violence and torture were a not uncommon way to convince captured crews to reveal hidden cargo or personal effects. Even a few coins in a captain’s chest were held as sufficient evidence to bring a vessel in for trial and condemnation. Spanish judges, particularly in the “piratical ports” of Trinidad and Baracoa, and at times Havana and Santiago de Cuba as well, were themselves often investors in guardacostas and were not likely to view seized vessels with much criticism. They were aided by the fact that guardacostas commonly abandoned most of their prisoners at sea before returning to port—leaving fewer voices to testify. After condemnation, the seized vessel and its cargo were sold, or taken by the privateers to replace their own vessels, and the captured Anglo-Americans left to find their own way home—often with the help of South Sea Company factors. Despite the histrionics of the London press, few British sailors were put to hard labor on Spanish fortifications or rotted in Spanish prisons.

• Due to the dangers of Spanish guardacostas, the sloops that made up the majority of smuggling vessels were “fitted out in a defensible and expensive manner” with a minimum of two dozen crewmen—and often twice that number—and an average of eight guns. To encourage the crew to fight when confronted by Spanish authorities, wages were high—nearly £3 sterling per month—and at least in some instances sailors were also allowed to carry their own small bundle of goods to sell.

• After condemnation, the seized vessel and its cargo were sold, or taken by the privateers to replace their own vessels, and the captured Anglo-Americans left to find their own way home—often with the help of South Sea Company factors. Despite the histrionics of the London press, few British sailors were put to hard labor on Spanish fortifications or rotted in Spanish prisons.
• The use of false colors to approach a target covertly was a particularly common tactic.
• Invariably, even if a vessel was released, it would be plundered; crewmen and passenger’s clothing was especially vulnerable—a sign of the value and shortage of European textiles in Spanish Caribbean islands.
• Before a prize and its cargo could be properly sold, and the captors assured of their protection from any foreign complaints, it had to be legally condemned at trial. In this process, the ship was to be carried to port, the cargo inspected and inventoried by officials, and depositions taken from both captors and prisoners. Then the judge would make his decision.

• Yet at the same time as they were supplying the Spanish with guardacostas, the [South Sea] Company’s factories were sources of aid and succor to the Anglo-Americans who were their victims. The Cuban factories were most active in this regard due to the high number of prizes brought into those ports. When a prize was brought in, factors frequently represented the victims before the governor, arguing that any Spanish coin aboard came from dealings with the Company’s agents in Jamaica … On the frequent occasions when a vessel was condemned, the factors provided food, shelter, and travel to Jamaica out of their own pockets.